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The Copyright Act of 1976 and Prejudgment Interest 
Jon M. Powers 
INTRODUCTION 
In formulating the remedy provisions of the Copyright Act of 
1976,1 Congress intended "to give the courts specific unambiguous 
directions concerning monetary awards" and "reasonable latitude 
to adjust recovery to the circumstances of the case."2 Despite this 
intention, congressional silence on the issue of prejudgment interest 
has failed to provide needed direction for this important but often 
overlooked3 element of monetary awards. In the absence of con-
gressional guidance, courts have treated the issue of prejudgment 
interest in conflicting ways. 
Congress's failure to provide explicit guidance concerning pre-
judgment interest is especially troublesome because the 1976 Copy-
1. 17 u.s.c. §§ 101-1101 (1994). 
2. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1976). 
3. The tendency of the courts to overlook prejudgment interest may stem from ancient 
Jewish and Christian teachings that held that all interest is usurious, immoral, and illegal. See 
1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES § 3.6(1) (2d ed. 1993); Anthony E. Rothschild, Com-
ment, Prejudgment Interest: Survey and Suggestion, 11 Nw. U. L. REv. 192, 195 (1982). Mod-
ern society has come to reject these ancient notions and to view interest as proper 
consideration for the use of money, which allows people to "buy time and goods that other-
wise could not be available." 1 DOBBS, supra, § 3.6(1), at 334. 
Despite the modern view of interest, the ancient attitudes continue to infect the common 
Jaw treatment of interest recoveries. The traditional rule concerning prejudgment interest 
holds that courts should not award prejudgment interest unless the plaintiff's claim is liqui-
dated or ascertainable. See id. § 3.6(1); Joel A. Williams, Comment, Prejudgment Interest: 
An Element of Damages Not to be Overlooked, 8 CUMB. L. REv. 521, 521-22 & n.8 (1977) 
(collecting cases). This rule treats prejudgment interest, not as an element of the plaintiff's 
damages, but as a penalty imposed upon the defendant for failing promptly to pay fixed 
damages. See id. at 522. Thus, the defendant generally is not penalized when the amount of 
damages is uncertain because she cannot make payment until the amount of damages has 
been fixed by the court. See id. 
The traditional rule has been criticized for being overly concerned with the defendant's 
plight and treating plaintiffs differently based on the nature of their claims. See Rothschild, 
supra, at 198-99. Regardless of the initial uncertainty as to the extent of the plaintiff's claim, 
he is deprived of the use of that money. The money ultimately found to be owed to the 
plaintiff, at least in theory, has been earning interest for the defendant and should have 
earned "the exact amount due as prejudgment interest." Kent W. Seifried, Note, Recovery of 
Prejudgment Interest on an Unliquidated State Claim Arising Within the Sixth Circuit, 46 U. 
CIN. L. REv. 151, 164 (1977); see also, Rothschild, supra, at 198-99. Consequently, uncer-
tainty as to the amount of the defendant's liability does not impair her ability to pay the 
damages. 
Another explanation for the reluctance of courts to grant prejudgment interest is that the 
decision to grant prejudgment interest only arises, if at all, after the court has resolved the 
underlying liability issues. As a result, courts tend to resolve the issue in a cursory and impa-
tient manner. See id. at 194; see also Charles T. McCormick, Interest as Damages, 9 N.C. L. 
REV. 237, 255-56 (1931). 
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right Act provides two fundamentally different types of damage 
awards. The relevant remedy provision of the 1976 Act offers the 
copyright owner a choice of recovering either her actual damages 
plus the infringer's profits or statutory damages.4 If the copyright 
owner elects the damages-plus-profits option, section 504(b) re-
quires her to prove her actual damages caused by the infringement 
as well as the infringer's profits.5 Alternatively, a copyright owner 
may elect to recover statutory damages.6 Generally, when the 
copyright owner elects this latter option, the court has broad discre-
tion to fix an award within the statutory limits of $500 and $20,000.7 
The copyright owner need not present proof of actual damages and 
4. The damages provision of the 1976 Copyright Act is § 504 which states: "Except as 
otherwise provided by this title, an infringer of copyright is liable for either - (1) the copy-
right owner's actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer, as provided by sub-
section (b); or (2) statutory damages, as provided by subsection (c)." 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) 
(1994). 
This Note refers to the§ 504(b) remedy as "damages plus profits" and the§ 504(c) rem-
edy as "statutory damages." 
5. Section 504(b) provides: 
The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a 
result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the 
infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages. In estab-
lishing the infringer's profits, the copyright owner is required to present proof only of 
the infringer's gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or her deductible 
expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted 
work. 
17 u.s.c. § 504(b) (1994). 
6. Section 504(c) of the 1976 Copyright Act states: 
(1) Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner may elect, 
at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and 
profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with 
respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for which 
any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than $500 
or more than $20,000 as the court considers just. For the purposes of this subsection, all 
the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute one work. 
(2) In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court 
finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase 
the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $100,000. In a case where the 
infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not 
aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of 
copyright, the court [in] its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a 
sum of not less than $250. The court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an 
infringer believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the 
copyrighted work was a fair use under section 107, if the infringer was: (i) an employee 
or agent of a nonprofit institution, library, or archives acting within the scope of his or 
her employment who, or such institution, library, or archives itself, which infringed by 
reproducing the work in copies or phonorecords; or (ii) a public broadcasting entity 
which or a person who, as a regular part of the nonprofit activities of a public broadcast-
ing entity (as defined in subsection (g) of section 118) infringed by performing a pub-
lished nondramatic literary work or by reproducing a transmission program embodying a 
performance of such a work. 
17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1994). 
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(l) (1994); H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 162 (stating that 
the court can exercise discretion in awarding an amount within $250 and $10,000). The limits 
set by the 1976 Act since have been amended to $500 and $20,000, respectively. See Berne 
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § lO(b), 102 Stat. 2853, 2860 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1994)). 
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profits, although the court is free to consider evidence of damages 
and profits in setting an award. 
Nearly all of the reported cases that deal with the issue of pre-
judgment interest have involved damages-plus-profits awards.s 
Courts have taken three approaches to determining the availability 
of prejudgment interest on damages-plus-profits awards. One ap-
proach presumptively grants prejudgment interest on all damages-
plus-profits awards under the 1976 Act. The Tenth Circuit, in Kleier 
Advertising, Inc. v. Premier Pontiac, lnc.,9 adopted this approach.10 
That result was consistent with that Circuit's general rule that pre-
judgment interest is presumptively available on all federal claims.11 
A second approach denies prejudgment interest on all copyright 
damages awards. In Robert R. Jones Associates v. Nino Homes,12 
the Sixth Circuit held that the remedies specifically identified in the 
1976 Act were sufficient to provide an effective deterrent to in-
fringement.13 The court noted that the Copyright Act does not spe-
cifically mention interest, unlike the Patent Act which explicitly 
includes interest as an element of damages. The court held that 
Congress must have believed that the discretionary award of costs 
and attorney's fees would be sufficient to handle cases of flagrant 
infringement.14 Nino suggests that the 1976 Act precludes the 
award of prejudgment interest, even in extraordinary cases.1s 
8. Compare In Design v. K-Mart Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 569 (2d Cir. 1994) (constru-
ing§ 504 (b)); Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., Nos. 91-56248, 91-56379, 
91-56289, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 4068, at *23-*25 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 1993) (same); United 
States Payphone, Inc. v. Executives Unlimited, Nos. 89-1081, 89-1085, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 
7599, at *13 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 1991) (same); Kleier Advertising, Inc. v. Premier Pontiac, Inc., 
921 F.2d 1036, 1041 (10th Cir. 1990) (same); Robert R. Jones Assocs., Inc. v. Nino Homes, 
858 F.2d 274, 282 (6th Cir. 1988) (same); In Design v. Lauren Knitwear Corp, 782 F. Supp. 
824, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same); Tracy v. Skate Key, Inc., No. 86 CIV. 3439 (MBM), 1990 
WL 9855, at (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1990) (same); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Golden Horse Inn 
Corp., 709 F. Supp. 580, 581 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson Publish-
ers, Inc., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897, 1914 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (same) revd. on other grounds, 889 
F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1058 (1994); Blackman v. Hustler Magazine, 
Inc., 620 F. Supp. 792, 802 (D.D.C. 1985) (same), modified, 800 F.2d 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1986); 
Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Labs., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1325, 1327-28 (E,D, Pa. 1985) 
(same); Aitken, Mazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 264 
(D. Neb. 1982) (same) with Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Nortel Grill, Inc., No. CIV-89-1278E, 
1991WL172079, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1991) (construing§ 504(c)); Paramount Pictures 
Corp. v. Metro Program Network, Inc., Nos. C89-0013, C88-0090, 1991 WL 348168, at *12 
(N.D. Iowa Apr. 8, 1991) (same). 
9. 921 F.2d 1036 {10th Cir. 1990). 
10. See 921 F.2d at 1040-42. 
11. See 921 F.2d at 1042. 
12. 858 F.2d 274 (6th Cir. 1988). 
13. See 858 F.2d at 282. 
14. See 858 F.2d at 282 & n.8. 
15. See 858 F.2d at 282; see also Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. 
Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 264 (D. Neb. 1982) (refusing to allow prejudgment interest because it is 
not authorized by the 1976 Act). 
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·Between these two extremes, a third approach views the deci-
sion to grant prejudgment interest on damages-plus-profits awards 
as discretionary - appropriate only in cases of flagrant or bad-faith 
infringement. In Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson Publishers, 
Inc., 16 the court declined to grant prejudgment interest on a 
damages-plus-profits award under the 1976 Act.17 Assuming pre-
judgment interest was available under federal common law, the 
court stated that it should be awarded only in exceptional cases, 
such as when there is bad-faith infringement.1s 
The propriety of granting prejudgment interest on the other 
remedy option, statutory damages, is also unclear; the few cases 
that have addressed the availability of prejudgment interest on stat-
utory damages under the 1976 Act have not reached uniform re-
sults. In Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Metro Program Network, 
Inc., 19 the court granted prejudgment interest on a statutory-
damages recovery while citing cases that dealt with the issue in the(_::-,~, 
context of damages-plus-profits awards.20 Although the court did 
not explain why those cases applied in the statutory-damages con-
text, the court found them to be "well reasoned and elect[ ed] to 
follow them."21 In contrast, the court in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. 
Nortel Grill, Inc., 22 declined to apply the reasoning developed in 
damages-plus-profits cases to a statutory-damages case and held 
that an award of prejudgment interest was inappropriate.23 · 
This Note argues that prejudgment interest should be presump-
tively available on damages-plus-profits awards under section 
504(b) but should not be available for statutory damages under sec-
16. 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897 (C.D. Cal 1987), revd. on other grounds, 889 F.2d 197 (9th 
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1058 (1994). 
17. See 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914; see also Alois Valerian Gross, Annotation, Interest 
on Copyright Damages, 91 A.L.R. Fed. 839, 847 (1989). 
18. See 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914. 
19. Nos. C89-0013, C88-0090, 1991 WL 348168 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 8, 1991). 
20. See 1991 WL 348168, at *12. 
21. 1991 'wL 348168, at *12. 
22. No. CIV-89-1278E, 1991 WL 172079 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1991). 
23. See 1991WL172079, at *2. The court noted that in damages-plus-profits cases courts 
award prejudgment interest to provide full compensation to copyright owners. See 1991 WL 
172079, at *2. Since the copyright owner in Nortel Grill did not show that statutory damages 
would not provide full compensation, the court concluded that prejudgment interest was in-
appropriate. See 1991 WL 172079, at *2. The court's reasoning implies that prejudgment 
interest may be appropriate when the copyright owner proves that the statutory damages 
award will not provide adequate compensation. 
Another case, decided under the 1909 Act, also may provide some insight into this issue. 
In Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 257 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), the court held, 
that, even if prejudgment interest was available under the 1909 Act, the court would not 
award it because the plaintiff had chosen not to prove actual damages and instead had recov-
ered the "more speculative" statutory damages. See 257 F. Supp. at 730. The court decided 
that, since it had used its discretion to set the damage award above the usual maximum, the 
aim of making the plaintiff whole had been achieved. See 257 F. Supp. at 730-31. 
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tion 504(c). Part I argues that Supreme Court precedent suggests 
that the explicit reference to interest found in the Patent Act does 
not prevent courts from awarding prejudgment interest under the 
1976 Copyright Act. Part II asserts that the 1976 Copyright Act's 
silence regarding prejudgment interest does not represent a con-
gressional choice to exclude this remedy and that, in the face of this 
silence, the underlying purposes of section 504 should determine 
the propriety of prejudgment interest awards. This Part concludes 
that courts may grant prejudgment interest on damages-plus-profits 
awards to fulfill the Act's compensation and restitution goals but 
may not do so on statutory-damages awards because of Congress's 
desire to set explicit limits on this type of liability. Part III suggests 
a standard whereby prejudgment interest should be awarded on 
damages-plus-profits awards unless the copyright owner unreasona-
bly delayed asserting her copyright or there was a legitimate ques-
tion as to the copyrightability of the infringed work. 
I. COMPARISON TO THE PATENT Acr 
The omission of any reference to prejudgment interest in the 
1976 Copyright Act, by itself, does not indicate that Congress in-
tended to prevent courts from granting prejudgment interest. 'fypi-
cally, statutory interpretation begins with the plain language of the 
statute.24 The plain language of the 1976 Act, however, fails to pro-
vide much guidance on this issue.25 A traditional source of assist-
ance in interpreting copyright statutes has been the patent 
statutes.26 This Part reasons that the explicit inclusion of interest 
awards within the remedy provision of the Patent Act does not 
24. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989); Flora v. United 
States, 357 U.S. 63, 65 (1958) ("In matters of statutory construction the duty of this Court is 
to give effect to the intent of Congress, and in doing so our first reference is to the literal 
meaning of words employed."); see also 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
§ 46.01 (Norman J. Singer ed., 5th ed. 1992) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND]. 
25. One could argue that, according to the canon of construction expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius, the omission of any reference to interest in the statute excludes 
prejudgment-interest awards. According to expressio unius, "[l]egislative prescription of a 
specified sanction for noncompliance with statutory requirements has been held to exclude 
the application of other sanctions." 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 24, § 47.23. The 1976 Act 
provides an array of remedies consisting of injunctions, impoundment of infringing articles, 
damages, costs, and attorney's fees. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-05 (1994). Applying expressio 
unius to the 1976 Act thus would result in the conclusion that Congress, by specifying certain 
remedies, implicitly rejected all others. However, the Supreme Court has held that "the fail-
ure to mention interest in statutes which create obligations has not been interpreted by [this] 
Court as manifesting an unequivocal congressional purpose that the obligation shall not bear 
interest." Rodgers v. United States, 332 U.S. 371, 373 (1947); see infra notes 44-49 and ac-
companying text. 
26. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) 
("[I]t is appropriate to refer [to the patent laws] because of the historic kinship between 
patent law and copyright Jaw."); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 
(1948) (same). 
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compel the conclusion that Congress rejected the idea of awarding 
prejudgment interest under the 1976 Copyright Act. 
In deciding whether or not interest is allowable under the 1976 
Copyright Act, courts have compared its remedy provisions to 
those of the Patent Act, which explicitly provide for the award of 
interest.27 A majority of courts that have performed this compari-
son have concluded that the differences in the two statutes compel 
the conclusion that Congress rejected prejudgment-interest awards 
under the 1976 Act.28 These courts held that because the Patent 
Act, which governs similar subject matter, explicitly allows courts to 
award interest, the Copyright Act's silence suggests that Congress 
did not intend for prejudgment interest to be available under that 
statute.29 
27. See, e.g., Robert R. Jones Assocs. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 282 n.8 (6th Cir. 
1988); Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1325, 1328 (E.D. Pa. 1985), 
modified, 800 F.2d 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1986); cf. Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 
Inc., 886 F.2d 1545, 1551 (9th Cir. 1989) (using the Patent Act to determine if prejudgment 
interest is appropriate under the 1909 Act), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1017 (1990); Broadcast 
Music, Inc. v. Golden Horse Inn Corp., 709 F. Supp. 580, 581 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (citing Baldwin 
Cooke Co. v. Keith Clark, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 404, 409 (N.D. Ill. 1976), which denied prejudg-
ment interest under the 1909 Act based on a similar comparison to the Patent Act); Aitzen, 
Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 264 (D. Neb. 1982) 
(same). 
The relevant provision of the Patent Act states: "Upon finding for the claimant the court 
shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no 
event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, to-
gether with interest and costs as fixed by the court." 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) (emphasis 
added). 
28. See Robert R. Jones Assocs., 858 F.2d at 282; cf. Broadcast Music, 709 F. Supp. at 581 
(citing Baldwin Cooke, 420 F. Supp. at 409, which denied prejudgment interest under the 
1909 Act based on a similar comparison to the Patent Act); Whelan Assocs., 609 F. Supp. at 
1327-28 (holding that the omission of prejudgment-interest language in the 1976 Act requires 
the use of the federal common law rule as it existed before the Patent Act was amended to 
include interest); Aitzen, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C., 542 F. Supp. at 264 (citing Baldwin 
Cooke). 
29. See Robert R. Jones Assocs., 858 F.2d at 282 n.8; Baldwin Cooke, 420 F. Supp. at 409 
(1909 Act). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit, in Robert R. Jones Assocs., held that "[t]his distinc-
tion [between the patent and copyright statutes] suggests that Congress believed that giving 
the court in copyright infringement cases the discretionary authority to award costs and attor-
neys' fees would be sufficient to enable the court to enhance the deterrent force of the law in 
cases of flagrant misconduct." Robert R. Jones Assocs., 858 F.2d at 282 n.8. This conclusion, 
however, is questionable in light of the fact that Congress used the availability of attorneys' 
fees as an incentive for copyright owners to register their works promptly. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 412(2) (1994) (denying attorney's fees for "any infringement of copyright commenced after 
first publication of the work and before the effective date of its registration, unless such 
registration is made within three months after the first publication of the work"). Also, one 
commentator has criticized this argument because it fails to account for the different func-
tions served by costs, attorney's fees, and prejudgment interest. See James L. Bernard, Note, 
Prejudgment Interest and the Copyright Act of 1976, 5 FORDHAM INTELL PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 427, 474-75 (1995) (arguing that costs and attorneys' fees provide compensation for 
losses due to litigation whereas prejudgment interest provides compensation for damages due 
to delay). 
The Ninth Circuit, in Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 886 F.2d 1545 
(9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1071 (1990), took a different approach to comparing the 
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This interpretation, however, is inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court's analysis of differences between the two statutes. Because 
the Supreme Court regularly has imported concepts from the pat-
ent statute that were not mentioned explicitly in the corresponding 
copyright statute, the fact that the Patent Act contains explicit ref-
erences to interest does not automatically evidence a congressional 
rejection of interest awards under the 1976 Act. 
For example, in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,3o the 
Court allowed expert testimony regarding the apportionment of 
profits under the 1909 Copyright Act even though Congress had 
amended the Patent Act specifically to allow this type of testimony 
but failed to do the same to the 1909 Copyright Act.31 The Court 
noted that the amendment to the Patent Act only recognized and 
did not expand a general rule that already had existed in courts of 
equity and concluded that Congress's failure to make a similar 
amendment to the 1909 Copyright Act did not foreclose the use of 
that general rule under the copyright law.32 
More recently, in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, 33 the Court held that the manufacture of videotape record-
ers did not constitute contributory infringement of copyrighted tele-
vision broadcasts.34 In reaching this result, the Court used the 
"staple article of commerce" doctrine from patent law to determine 
contributory infringement, despite the fact that the 1976 Copyright 
Act did not expressly include contributory-infringement liability, 
and the Patent Act did.35 The Court held that the lack of explicit 
language in the 1976 Copyright Act did not preclude the imposition 
of contributory-infringement liability for copyright infringement.36 
In these cases, the Court looked beyond mere differences in the 
statutes and supplemented the copyright statute with general equi-
table rules. In Sheldon, the Court decided that because the 1909 
Copyright Act required courts to award only the profits that re-
sulted from the infringement and not from other aspects of the in-
fringer's work or business, courts could allow expert testimony to 
Patent Act to the 1909 Copyright Act, focusing on the availability of damages and profits 
under the two statutes. See infra text accompanying note 66. 
30. 309 U.S. 390 (1940). 
31. See 309 U.S. at 405. 
32. See 309 U.S. at 405 ("[T]he fact that the copyright law was not similarly amended 
cannot be considered to detract from the jurisdiction of the court to receive similar evidence 
in copyright cases .... "). 
33. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
34. See 464 U.S. at 434-42. 
35. See 464 U.S. at 434, 439, 442. 
36. See 464 U.S. at 435. Concededly, the Court reached this conclusion, in part, because 
vicarious liability was imposed in almost all other areas of the law. Nevertheless, the Court 
explicitly held that "[t]he absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not 
preclude the imposition of [contributory-infringement] liability." 464 U.S. at 435. 
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make this determination.37 Similarly, in Sony, the Court applied 
the patent-law contributory-infringement test because one of the 
purposes of the 1976 Act was to protect the copyright owner's mo-
nopoly, and adequate protection of this monopoly might require 
application of co~tributory-infringement liability.38 Therefore, in 
deciding whether prejudgment interest is allowable under the 1976 
Act, courts should look beyond the difference between the Patent 
Act and the Copyright Act and apply the general rules for deciding 
whether or not prejudgment interest is appropriate under a silent 
federal statute. 
A possible explanation for the difference between the two stat-
utes regarding prejudgment interest is the differing state of the case 
law when Congress enacted the patent and copyright statutes. In 
1946, when Congress amended the Patent Act to include the award 
of interest, there existed a body of case law holding that prejudg-
ment interest on patent damages generally was only available from 
the time damages were liquidated - typically the entering of judg-
ment - and not from the date of infringement.39 In order to avoid 
ratifying this long-standing test, Congress had to add explicit lan-
guage concerning the award of interest.40 
In contrast, when Congress passed the 1976 revisions to the 
Copyright Act, there was limited precedent on the issue of prejudg-
ment interest under the 1909 Copyright Act. In Frank Music Corp. 
v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, lnc.41 the court, in determining whether 
the 1909 Act allowed prejudgment interest, explained that "[o]nly 
one circuit ha[ d] considered the availability of prejudgment interest 
in a copyright infringement action and that case construed the 1976 
Act, not the 1909 Act. "42 The court also noted one case that had 
upheld the award of prejudgment interest without discussing the is-
sue, but that case was a 1978 case, decided after the enactment of 
the 1976 Act.43 There did not exist a common law standard that 
had to be ratified or rejected. This fact may account for Congress's 
omission of specific language concerning prejudgment interest in 
the 1976 Copyright Act. 
37. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 404-5 (1940). 
38. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 442. 
39. See General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 651 (1983); Duplate Corp. v. 
Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448 (1936); Tiighman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 160 (1888). 
40. See Devex, 461 U.S. at 653-4. See generally 3 SUTHERLAND, supra note 24, §§ 61.01-
06 (indicating that courts should construe strictly statutes that abrogate the common law). 
41. 886 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1017 (1990). 
42. 886 F.2d at 1551. 
43. See 886 F.2d at 1551 (citing Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, 592 F.2d 
651, 656 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
1334 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:1326 
II. PuRPosEs OF SECTION 504 OF THE 1976 COPYRIGHT Acr 
The Supreme Court's treatment of other statutes silent on the 
issue of prejudgment interest indicates that congressional silence, in 
and of itself, does not preclude prejudgment-interest awards; rather 
courts should consider the underlying purposes of the statute to de-
termine if prejudgment-interest is appropriate. Section II.A ana-
lyzes the Court's general approach to dealing with silent statutes 
and concludes that it is proper to explore Congress's objectives for 
section 504 to determine if prejudgment interest is appropriate 
under the 1976 Copyright Act. Section II.B argues that awarding 
prejudgment interest for damages-plus-profits awards is consistent 
with Congress's intention to provide compensation to copyright 
owners and prevent the unjust enrichment of infringers. Section 
II.C asserts that awarding prejudgment interest on statutory-
damages awards is inconsistent with Congress's desire to place ab-
solute limits on them and to avoid overly artificial awards. 
A. The General Treatment of Silent Federal Statutes 
As a general rule, courts grant prejudgment interest under other 
federal statutes that do not contain specific provisions regarding 
prejudgment interest if doing so will further congressional objec-
tives. In Rodgers v. United States, 44 the seminal case on this issue, 
the Court held that "the failure to mention interest in statutes 
which create obligations has not been interpreted by [this] Court as 
manifesting an unequivocal congressional purpose that the obliga-
tion not bear interest."45 The Court held that the question of 
whether or not prejudgment interest is available is answered by de-
termining if awarding it is consistent with Congress's purpose in im-
posing the statutory obligation.46 
The Supreme Court recently has added two threshold require-
ments to the Rodgers analysis. In Monessen Southwestern Railway 
v: Morgan, 47 the Court held that, before a court can explore Con-
gress's purposes in providing a remedy, it must examine (1) the gen-
. eral common law as it existed when Congress enacted the statute, 
and (2) if Congress subsequently has amended the statute, the case 
law interpreting the availability of prejudgment interest under the 
44. 332 U.S. 371 (1947) (construing the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (AAA)). 
45. 332 U.S. at 373. 
46. See 332 U.S. at 374. Ultimately, the Court detennined that prejudgment-interest 
awards were inconsistent with Congress's goals for the Agricultural Adjustment Act because 
of the penal, instead of compensatory, nature of that statute's remedy provisions. Still, the 
Court decided that mere silence is not dispositive of the issue. See 332 U.S. at 374-76. 
47. 486 U.S. 330 (1988). 
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prior statute.48 If, at common law or under the statute's prior case 
law, courts held that prejudgment interest was inappropriate for 
that type of obligation, Congress's failure clearly to overturn these 
results strongly suggests that Congress approved of the courts' prior 
treatment of the issue.49 
The 1976 Copyright Act satisfies the first prong of the test laid 
out in Monessen. Well before the middle of this century, courts had 
repudiated the ancient common law prohibition of prejudgment in-
terest on unliquidated damages awarded for injury to property or 
business.50 Given that copyright-infringement claims are actions 
claiming injury to property,51 when Congress enacted the 1976 
Copyright Act, the federal common law did not categorically bar 
prejudgment interest on copyright-infringement claims. 
The 1976 Act also meets Monessen's second test - consistency 
with prior case law. Few courts had addressed the issue of prejudg-
ment interest under the 1909 Copyright Act when Congress passed 
the 1976 Act.s2 Nor did there exist a "virtual unanimity" among the 
courts that prejudgment interest was unavailable under the 1976 
Act when Congress amended section 504in1988.53 As a result, for 
the 1976 Act, the Monessen criteria will not be dispositive; it will be 
necessary to perform the Rodgers analysis and examine Congress's 
purposes in creating the two types of remedies in section 504. 
B. Damages-Plus-Profits Awards 
Congress's purpose in creating the damages-plus-profits provi-
sion was to compensate copyright owners and prevent the unjust 
48. See Monessen, 486 U.S. at 337-39. The statute at issue in Monessen, the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988), awarded damages for personal 
injury and wrongful death. See 486 U.S. at 337. In 1908, when FELA was enacted, the com-
mon law barred the recovery of prejudgment interest on those types of damages. See 486 
U.S. at 337. 
Moreover, the Monessen Court held that Congress's failure to amend FELA in the face of 
courts' "virtual unanimity over more than seven decades" that prejudgment interest should 
not be available under FELA represented Congress's acquiescence in that interpretation. 
486 U.S. at 338. 
49. See 486 U.S. at 337. 
50. See Wickham Contracting Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Intl. Bhd. of Elec: Workers, 955 
F.2d 831, 837-38 (2d Cir.) (noting that "awards of prejudgment interest ... were acceptable 
well before the [1947 passage of the Labor Management Relations Act] in tort cases involv-
ing injury to property or business"), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 946 (1992). 
51. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 603 (1834); Creative Technology, Ltd. v. 
Aztech Syst. Pte., Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 704 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that federal copyright laws 
"'are designed to protect the property rights of copyright owners'" (quoting Anderson v. 
Nidorf, 26 F.3d 100, 102 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1399 (1995))). 
52. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. 
53. Congress amended § 504 by raising various statutory-damages limits in the Berne 
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § lO(b)(l)-(2), 102 Stat. 2853, 
2860 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C § 504(c) (1994)). 
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enrichment of infringers. The House Report on the 1976 Acts4 
states that the "basic aims" of section 504 were to provide courts 
with clear guidelines for awarding monetary damages and "reason-
able latitude" to shape awards to suit the facts of each case.ss The 
Report goes on to explain, in the section dealing with damages-
plus-profits awards, that "[d]amages are awarded to compensate 
the copyright owner for losses from infringement, and profits are 
awarded to prevent the infringer from unfairly benefiting from a 
wrongful act."S6 Accordingly, most courts have interpreted this 
part of the Report to mean that the goals of section 504(b) are com-
pensation and restitution.s1 
Awards of prejudgment interest are necessary to achieve the 
goal of compensating copyright owners for losses due to infringe-
ment. Under various statutes and common law actions, courts have 
"overwhelmingly and repeatedly" held that prejudgment interest is 
necessary to provide full compensation.ss The Supreme Court has 
reasoned that "[p]rejudgment interest is an element of complete 
compensation" because it "compensate[ s] for the loss of use of 
money due as damages from the time the claim accrues until judg-
ment is entered, thereby achieving full compensation for the injury 
those damages are intended to redress."S9 In Gorenstein Enter-
prises v. Quality Care-USA,60 a case decided under the Lanham 
54. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 161. 
55. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. These two goals might create "a tension" in 
determining the appropriateness of prejudgment-interest awards. See Bernard, supra note 
29, at 464. However, these two aims were intended to address three specific problems that 
arose under the 1909 Act: (1) whether actual damages and the infringer's profits both could 
be awarded, (2) the appropriate method of calculating the infringer's profits, and (3) when 
and how a court could award statutory damages. See id. at 466 n.177. Although it is not 
entirely clear, it is likely that the first aim, to provide clear guidelines for monetary damages, 
addresses the first two concerns, while the second aim, allowing reasonable latitude to adjust 
awards, deals with the third concern. Ultimately, the two stated aims of § 504 provide only 
limited guidance on the issue of prejudgment interest. 
56. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 161. 
57. See e.g., Kleier Advertising, Inc. v. Premier Pontiac, Inc., 921 F.2d 1036, 1041 (10th 
Cir. 1990); United States Payphone, Inc. v. Executives Unlimited, Inc., Nos. 89-1081, 89-1085, 
1991 WL 64957, at *4. But cf. infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
58. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 3, § 3.6(3) (citing cases). 
59. West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 310 n.2 (1987). It should be noted that 
in Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962), the Court declined to reverse a lower court's refusal 
to award interest on damages awarded under the Securities and Exchange Act because " 'in-
terest is not recovered according to a rigid theory of compensation for money withheld, but is 
given in response to considerations of fairness.'" 368 U.S. at 414 (quoting Board of Commrs. 
v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 352 (1939)). Though this language may appear to reject the 
idea that prejudgment interest is necessary for compensation, it is more likely that the Court, 
in making this observation, only intended to argue that prejudgment interest need not be 
awarded in every situation and not to reject the general proposition that interest serves a 
compensatory role in damage awards. See infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing cases in which courts should not award prejudgment interest under the 1976 Copy-
right Act). 
60. 874 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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Act, the Seventh Circuit announced a general rule that prejudg-
ment interest should be available for all violations of federal law 
because "[w]ithout it, compensation of the plaintiff is incom-
plete. "61 The Tenth Circuit, in Kleier Advertising, Inc. v. Premier 
Pontiac, Inc., 62 applied this general rule to the copyright context63 
and held that prejudgment interest was necessary to achieve the 
goal of compensating copyright owners under the 1976 Act.64 
In addition to providing complete compensation to the copy-
right owner, prejudgment-interest awards on the infringer's profits 
further the second goal of section 504(b ): preventing the infringer 
from benefiting from his wrongful act. As a general rule, courts 
award interest to prevent a defendant from keeping the interest 
that accrues on funds that belong to the plaintiff.65 The Ninth Cir-
cuit, in Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 66 a case 
decided under the 1909 Act, held that, to serve fully the restitution-
ary purpose of awarding profits, courts should require infringers to 
pay prejudgment interest on their profits.67 The court explained 
that interest that accrues on profits from infringement can be 
viewed as another form of indirect profit attributable to the in-
fringement. 68 The court concluded that there is no meaningful dis-
tinction between profits derived from the promotional use of the 
copyrighted work, which courts regularly awarded the copyright 
owner, and profits derived from the use of the revenue generated 
by the infringement.69 In Kleier Advertising, Inc. v. Premier 
Pontiac, Inc., 10 the Tenth Circuit applied this reasoning to the 1976 
Act.71 The Tenth Circuit held that prejudgment-interest awards 
were necessary to fulfill the 1976 Act's goal of preventing unjust 
enricbment.12 
61. 874 F.2d at 436. 
62. 921 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1990). 
63. See 921 F.2d at 1041-42 (explaining that allowing prejudgment interest under the 1976 
Copyright Act "comports with [the court's] earlier decision that 'under federal law prejudg-
ment interest is ordinarily awarded, absent some justification for withholding it' " (quoting 
United States Indus., Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1256 (10th Cir. 1988))). 
64. See 921 F.2d at 1042. 
65. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 3, § 3.6(2), at 344 (If "the objective of the court is to force 
disgorgement of [a defendant's] unjust enrichment, interest upon the funds or property [held 
wrongfully] may be necessary to force complete restitution."). 
66. 886 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1017 (1990). 
67. See 886 F.2d at 1552. 
68. See 886 F.2d at 1552. 
69. See 886 F.2d at 1552. 
70. 921 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1990). 
71. See 921 F.2d at 1041. 
72. See 921 F.2d at 1041. The author of a prominent treatise has argued that the authority 
upon which the Kleier court relied is questionable. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT§ 14.02[B], at 14-25 to 14-26 (1995). The court cited Frank 
Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 886 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 
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Some courts have reasoned that, because the 1976 Act allows 
courts to award both actual damages and the infringer's profits, the 
compensation and deterrence73 goals can be achieved without pre-
judgment interest.74 The majority view under the 1909 Copyright 
U.S. 1017 {1990) and Gorenstein Entersprises v. Quality Care-USA, 874 F.2d 431, 436 (7th 
Cir. 1988). See Kleier, 921 F.2d at 1041. In Frank Music, the Ninth Circuit decided that the 
1909 Copyright Act allowed prejudgment-interest awards. See 886 F.2d at 1550-53; see also 
supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text. Under the 1909 Act, only the greater of actual 
damages or the infringer's profits, but not both, were available. See 886 F.2d at 1552. The 
court held that the award of only actual damages or profits would not necessarily compensate 
the copyright owner based on an analogy to the 1946 amendments to the Patent Act which 
explicitly allowed interest awards. See 886 F.2d at 1552. The court reasoned that prior to the 
1946 amendments, the Patent Act allowed plaintiffs to recover both actual damages and the 
infringer's profits. See 886 F 2d at 1552. But in 1946, Congress eliminated the recovery of the 
infringer's profits and, in a "quid pro quo for the unavailability of profits," allowed the recov-
ery of interest to provide full compensation. 886 F.2d at 1552 n.9 (citing General Motors 
Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648 {1983)). Because the 1909 Act limited recovery to either 
actual damages or profits, but not both, the court concluded that it was appropriate to award 
prejudgment interest. See Frank Music, 886 F.2d at 1552 n. 9. The Ninth Circuit expressed 
no opinion as to the propriety of prejudgment-interest awards under the 1976 Act. See 886 
F2d at 1552. 
Professor Nimmer has argued that the Tenth Circuit's reasoning is inapplicable to the 
1976 Act because it now allows the recovery of both actual damages and infringer's profits. 
See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra, § 14.02[B], at 14-25 to 14-26. In addition, Professor 
Nimmer questioned the Tenth Circuit's reliance on Gorenstein, a trademark case decided 
under the Lanham Act, though he conceded that the general rule announced in Gorenstein 
may be the current trend. See id. 
Although it is true that the Ninth Circuit's analogy to Frank Music is far from clear, this 
Note argues that the court's result is still correct because the 1976 Act's cumulative - in-
stead of the 1909 Act's alternative - damages rule does not represent a congressional intent 
to preclude courts from awarding prejudgment interest. See infra notes 79-86 and accompa-
nying text (arguing that the 1976 Act's cumulative-damages rule does not eliminate the need 
for prejudgment interest). 
73. Most courts that have declined to award prejudgment interest on damages-plus-
profits awards have recast§ 504{b)'s second goal as deterrence instead of prevention of un-
just enrichment. See, e.g., Robert R. Jones Assocs. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 282 (6th 
Cir. 1988) (determining that the goals of the 1976 Act are to "promote innovation" and 
"deter unauthorized exploitation of someone else's creative expression"); Tracy v. Skate Key, 
Inc., No. 86 CIV. 3439, 1990 WL 9855 {S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1990) {holding that the "legitimate" 
goals of the 1976 Act are to compensate plaintiffs and deter potential defendants). The term 
"deterrence" may distort analysis by imputing more of a penal intent to Congress than is 
appropriate. Cf. supra note 46 (noting that the Supreme Court had declined to award pre-
judgment interest under the silent AAA because of its penal nature). To be sure, Congress 
intended to deter infringement; but§ 504{b)'s primary goals are compensation and preven-
tion of unjust enrichment. 
74. This argument was initially made in Baldwin v. Keith Clark, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 404 
{N.D. Ill. 1976), a case decided under the 1909 Act. In Baldwin, the court interpreted the 
1909 Act's remedy provisions as allowing courts to award both actual damages and infringer's 
profits. See Baldwin 420 F. Supp. at 405. This interpretation was the minority position under 
the 1909 Copyright Act. See supra note 72. The court concluded that "even in a case of 
flagrant infringement such as that presented here, the cumulative award of defendant's prof-
its and plaintiff's damages is sufficiently severe as to deter others from like conduct without 
the need for an award of prejudgment interest." 420 F. Supp. at 409. Given that the court 
held that the 1909 Act allowed cumulative awards, much of the court's reasoning remains 
relevant under the 1976 Act. Baldwin has been cited by courts, usually with little analysis, to 
support the proposition that prejudgment interest is unavailable under the 1976 Act. See 
Robert R. Jones Assocs., 858 F.2d at 282 (6th Cir. 1988); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Golden 
Horse Inn Corp., 709 F. Supp. 580, 581 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Blackman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 
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Act is that only the greater of actual damages or the infringer's 
profits, but not both, are available to the copyright owner.75 Con-
gress rejected this view when it explicitly stated that recoveries 
under the 1976 Act were to be "cumulative" - that the copyright 
owner was entitled to both her actual damages and the infringer's 
profits.76 Though one circuit has held implicitly that the cumulative 
nature of section 504 does not eliminate the need for prejudgment 
interest,77 other courts have suggested that the aggregate of the 
many components of the 1976 Act's remedy provisions provides 
sufficient compensation to the copyright owner and restitution by 
the infringer so that prejudgment-interest awards are unnecessary.78 
When a statute provides monetary awards consisting of multiple 
elements, however, the proper inquiry is whether Congress already 
has compensated the plaintiff for damages from the delay between 
the time of injury until the entering of judgment. In Brooklyn Sav-
ings Bank v. O'Neil, 79 the Supreme Court held that prejudgment 
interest should not be granted for double-backpay awards under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.so The Court noted that Con-
gress had provided the double-backpay remedy specifically to com-
pensate employees for delays in payment of minimum wages.81 The 
620 F. Supp. 792, 802 (D.D.C. 1985) (citing Baldwin while denying prejudgment interest on 
both 1909 Act and 1976 Act claims), modified, 800 F.2d 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Aitzen, Hazen, 
Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 264 (D. Neb. 1982). 
75. See Frank Music, 886 F.2d at 1552. 
76. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 161. 
77. Kleier Advertising, Inc., v. Premier Pontiac, Inc., 921 F.2d 1036, 1041 (10th Cir. 1990). 
78. In Robert R. Jones Assocs., the Sixth Circuit held that the actual damages it awarded 
were "clearly sufficient to. promote innovation ... and deter unauthorized exploitation." 
Robert R. Jones Assocs., 858 F.2d at 282. The court conceded that mere silence in the statute 
was not dispositive, but went on to rule that the difference between the 1976 Act and the 
Patent Act indicated that Congress believed that giving courts the ability to award costs and 
attorneys' fees would provide sufficient deterrent force. See 858 F.2d at 282. 
Other courts have viewed awards of prejudgment interest as windfalls bestowed upon 
copyright owners. For example, in Tracy v. Skate Key, Inc., No. 86 CIV. 3439, 1990 WL 9855 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1990), the court declined to award prejudgment interest under the 1976 
Act. See 1990 WL 9855, at *3. In that case, a painter had contracted with a skating rink to 
paint a mural on the outside of its rink for"$7500. The skating rink later changed its mind, 
cancelled its first progress payment, and painted over the mural. However, the rink had 
copied the mural and later used part of it as a logo. See 1990 WL 9855, at *l. The jury 
awarded the painter $7500 in actual damages and $57,500 representing the infringer's profits 
attributable to the logo. See 1990 WL 9855, at *3. In refusing to award prejudgment interest, 
the court noted the small amount of the initial contract relative to the infringer's profits. The 
court concluded that the jury's award was "sufficient to serve all the legitimate goals of the 
copyright laws, including compensation of plaintiffs and deterrence of potential defendants." 
1990 WL 9855, at *3. 
79. 324 U.S. 697 (1945). 
80. See 324 U.S. at 715. 
81. See 324 U.S. at 707. The Court stated that the double-backpay award 
constitutes a Congressional recognition that failure to pay the statutory minimum on 
time may be so detrimental to maintenance of the minimum standard of living [for cov-
ered workers] and to the free flow of commerce, that double payment must be made in 
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Court concluded that, because Congress already had provided a 
mechanism to compensate employees for delay damages, granting 
prejudgment interest would amount to a double recovery for de-
lay. 82 The Court's analysis in Brooklyn Savings is consistent with its 
more recent holdings that prejudgment interest serves to compen-
sate plaintiffs for damages due to delay.s3 Thus, if a statute already 
provides compensation for delay, prejudgment interest is unneces-
sary and inappropriate; if a statute fails to provide explicit compen-
sation for delay, it follows that prejudgment-interest awards remain 
proper. 
Because neither actual damages nor profits compensate the 
copyright owner for delay, the cumulative nature of damages-plus-
profits awards does not obviate the need for prejudgment-interest 
awards. Unlike the employees covered by the FLSA in Brooklyn 
Savings, copyright owners are not always entitled to the cumulative 
award of damages plus profits. As explained in the House Report, 
cumulative awards would be inappropriate when the copyright 
owner's actual damages correspond to the infringer's profits be-
cause "in effect they amount to the same thing."84 But Congress 
determined that cumulative awards are appropriate when some of 
the copyright owner's actual damages do not correspond to the in-
fringer's profits, or when the infringer has earned profits from the 
infringement that are not reflected in the actual damages.ss Be-
cause Congress's criteria for making cumulative awards has nothing 
to do with delay, it is unlikely that Congress intended for cumula-
~ive awards to compensate copyright owners for delay.s6 
the event of delay in order to insure restoration of the worker to that minimum standard 
of well-being. 
324 U.S. at 707 (footnote omitted). 
82. See 324 U.S. at 715. 
83. See, e.g., West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 310 n.2 (1987); General Motors 
Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 656 n.10 (1983). 
84. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 161. 
85. See id. 
86. Furthermore, some of the alleged "windfall" from cumulative awards "may actually 
be profit that the owner would have obtained from licensing his copyright to the infringer 
had the infringer sought a license." Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983). 
One commentator, in determining whether the cumulative nature of § 504(b) erected a 
per se bar to the recovery of prejudgment interest, has looked to the Patent Act of 1876 for 
guidance. See Bernard, supra note 29, at 469-72. He reasoned that the "availability" of pre-
judgment interest under the 1876 Patent Act, which allowed the recovery of both the paten-
tee's actual damages and the infringer's profits, 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1940), "strongly suggests" 
that the cumulative nature of section 504(b) does not preclude awards of prejudgment inter-
est. See Bernard, supra note 29, at 472; see also supra note 72 (discussing the quid-pro·quo 
argument made by the court in Frank Music). 
It is unlikely, however, that Congress intended for the remedy provisions of the 1876 
Patent Act to play a role in construing § 504(b ). In passing the 1909 Act, Congress made 
explicit reference to the 1876 Patent Act in the accompanying House Report. See H.R. REP. 
No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1909) (stating that the remedy provision of the 1909 Act is 
substantially the same provision found in the 1876 Patent Act and that the "courts have 
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C. Statutory-Damages Awards 
The rationale that supports granting prejudgment interest on 
damages-plus-profits awards does not apply to section 504's other 
type of remedy: statutory damages. The statutory-damages provi-
sion attempts to reconcile the inadequacy of damages-plus-profits 
awards in many cases and the desire to set limits on the infringers' 
liability.87 Congress reconciled these competing interests by requir-
ing that damages awarded under section 504( c) be within the statu-
tory limits.88 Although the court can look to evidence concerning 
actual damages and profits in setting an award within these limits,89 
unless one of the exceptions concerning willful or innocent infringe-
ment applies, the court cannot set an award exceeding the statutory 
maximum.90 
When the amount awarded under a statute does not directly re-
late to damages proven by the plaintiff, prejudgment interest is in-
appropriate. When Congress has defined the range of damages for 
plaintiffs who do not present evidence of actual damages, courts 
should treat the statutory award as fully compensatory and not 
award prejudgment interest.91 In addition, since statutory awards 
are inherently artificial, adding prejudgment interest to these 
usually construed that to mean that the owner of the patent might have one or the other [of 
damages or profits], whichever was the greater"). But this reference conflicted with the lan-
guage of the 1909 Act, which suggested that the award of profits and damages was to be 
cumulative. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 72, § 14.0l[A], at 14-4. Congress, in pass-
ing the 1976 Act, appeared to have completely disavowed the confusing approach adopted in 
1909 when it stated that a basic aim of § 504 was to avoid "the confusion and uncertainty that 
have marked the present law." H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 161. Thus, it is unlikely 
that Congress intended for courts to continue to make reference to a source of great confu-
sion under the prior statute. 
'OJ. See Register's Report on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 102 (1961) 
("The need for this special remedy [statutory damages] arises from the acknowledged inade-
quacy of actual damages and profits in many cases."), reprinted in 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, 
supra note 72, app. 14. 
88. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 162 ("[W]here the plaintiff elects to recover 
statutory damages, the court is obliged to award between $250 [since amended to $500] and 
$10,000 [since amended to $20,000].") 
89. See id. at 161. 
90. See id. at 162. 
91. In Marshall v. Security State Bank, 970 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1992), the Seventh Circuit 
held that, where the plaintiff had elected to recover statutory damages, prejudgment interest 
was not available under the Truth In Lending Act. See 910 F.2d at 385-86. The Truth In 
Lending Act holds a creditor who fails to comply with the Act's disclosure provisions liable 
for actual damages or statutory damages equal to twice the finance charge but not less than 
$100 or greater that $1,000. The plaintiff in that case had not proven actual damages and 
elected to recover the statutory damage maximum of $1,000. See 910 F.2d at 384. The court 
refused to award prejudgment interest on this award: "Where you have an arbitrary estab-
lishment of damages that has no relationship to what the actual damages might be ... you 
should [not] tack on prejudgment interest because the full compensation to these victims is 
what Congress says it should be." 970 F.2d at 386 (quoting the previous opinion in same 
action by bankruptcy judge) (emphasis added) (omissions and alterations in original). 
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awards does not mcrease their accuracy.92 This reasoning applies to 
the 1976 Act with equal force. The fact that Congress expressly 
defined the limits of statutory-damages awards suggests that it did 
not intend for courts to award prejudgment interest under section 
504(c).93 Moreover, granting prejudgment interest on the "more 
speculative" statutory-damages awards conflicts with Congress's 
aim of "avoiding artificial and overly technical awards."94 
III. A SUGGESTED STANDARD 
Courts should presumptively grant prejudgment interest on 
damages-plus-profits awards under the 1976 Copyright Act. The 
general trend in the federal courts is to do so presumptively.95 The 
rationale supporting this rule applies equally to the damages-plus-
profits provision of the 1976 Copyright Act.96 Under this standard, 
however, it is still necessary to identify those cases in which pre-
judgment interest should not be awarded. 
This Part focuses on situations when prejudgment interest is in-
appropriate. Initially, this Part suggests that prejudgment interest 
should not be awarded when the copyright owner has been largely 
responsible for the delay during which she wishes to recover inter-
est. This Part next argues that, because of the benefits to society of 
fixing the limits of the copyright monopoly, prejudgment interest 
should not be granted when the infringer was sufficiently justified in 
challenging the copyright. Finally, this Part rejects, as inconsistent 
with Supreme Court precedent, using the size of the damages-plus-
92. In Marshall the court noted that adding prejudgment interest to this "rough guess" at 
damages does not improve the accuracy of the award and that there was no reason to believe 
that Congress intended "courts to enter judgments like $1,050.46, and not $1,000, when it 
created the TILA scheme." 970 F.2d at 836. See also Montelongo v. Meese, 803 F.2d 1341 
(5th Cir. 1986) (declining to grant prejudgment interest on a $500 statutory award under the 
Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, which allowed plaintiffs to prove actual damages or 
collect $500), cert. denied, 481U.S.1048 (1987). 
93. Cf. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Nortel Grill, Inc., No. CIV-90-1278-E, 1991WL172079 
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1991). But see Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Metro Program Network, 
Inc., Nos. C89-6013, C88-0090, 1991 WL 348168 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 8, 1991) (granting prejudg-
ment interest on a statutory-damages award based on cases that dealt with the issue in the 
damages-plus-profits context). 
94. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 161. However, this is not to say that the court 
should not take the time from infringement to the entering of judgment into account in set-
ting the statutory-damages award; it should. But this factor should not allow courts to exceed 
the limits of§ 504(c). 
95. See Gorenstein Enters. v. Quality-Care USA, 874 F.2d 431, 436 (7th Cir. 1989) (an-
nouncing the rule that prejudgment interest should be presumptively available on all federal 
claims);_3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 72, § 14.02[B], at 14-26 ("[T]he trend may cur-
rently be towards awards of prejudgment interest generally in federal courts." (footnotes 
omitted)); cf. General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 657 (1983) (holding that 
courts should award prejudgment interest under the Patent Act "absent some justification for 
withholding such an award"). 
96. See supra notes 58-72 and accompanying text. 
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profits award as a factor in the decision whether or not to deny 
prejudgment interest. 
Prejudgment interest is inappropriate when the copyright owner 
has unreasonably delayed filing suit. Undue delay on the part of 
the plaintiff has been the Supreme Court's archetypal exception to 
the presumptive rule for awarding prejudgment interest under 
other statutes.97 The delay shifts the investment risk to the defend-
ant which allows the plaintiff to recover interest without bearing the 
corresponding risk.98 Likewise, courts should not award prejudg-
ment interest under the 1976 Copyright Act when the copyright 
owner has unreasonably delayed bringing suit. 
Prejudgment interest should not be awarded in cases that in-
volve novel defenses or claims of copyrightable subject matter. In 
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 99 the Court held that prevailing plaintiffs 
and prevailing defendants should be treated alike in awarding attor-
neys' fees under the 1976 Copyright Act.100 The Court explained 
that copyright law serves the purpose of enriching society through 
access to new works and that, to achieve this goal, it is important to 
demarcate the boundaries of copyright law as clearly as possible.101 
Because a successful defense to copyright infringement furthers this 
goal, "defendants who seek to advance a variety of meritorious 
copyright defenses should be encouraged to litigate them to the 
same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious 
claims of infringement. "102 
Reflecting this general concern, Justice Stevens, in his concur-
rence in General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 103 warned that the 
public benefit that derives from patent litigation should not be 
overlooked when deciding to award prejudgment interest.104 Jus-
tice Stevens, like the majority in Fogerty, noted the important role 
that litigation plays in circumscribing patent monopolies.10s 
97. See e.g., West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 311 n.3 (1987) ("This is not to 
say that an equitable consideration such as !aches cannot bar an otherwise valid claim for 
interest." (citation omitted)); General Motors Corp., 461 U.S. at 657 ("For example, it may be 
appropriate to limit prejudgment interest, or perhaps even deny it altogether, where the pat-
ent owner has been responsible for undue delay in prosecuting the lawsuit." (footnote 
omitted)). 
98. See Gorenstein, 874 F.2d at 439 (Ripple, J., concurring); Williamson v. Handy Button 
Mach. Co., 817 F.2d 1290, 1298 (7th Cir. 1987). 
99. 114 s. Ct. 1023 (1994). 
100. See 114 S. Ct. at 1033. 
101. See 114 S. Ct. at 1030. For instance, the Court in Fogerty unanimously held that John 
Fogerty, the defendant, was entitled to attorneys' fees for finally determining that the song 
" 'The Old Man Down the Road' was [not] merely 'Run Through the Jungle' with new 
words." 114 S.Ct. at 1026. 
102. 114 S. Ct. at 1030. 
103. 461 U.S. 648 (1983). 
104. See 461 U.S. at 658-59 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
105. See 461 U.S. at 658 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
1344 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:1326 
Although prejudgment interest is warranted in the "typical" in-
fringement case, there is a class of cases in which the infringer does 
not ultimately prevail but, nevei;theless, was "sufficiently justified" 
in challenging the patent to warrant the denial of prejudgment in-
terest.106 Courts should not award prejudgment interest under the 
1976 Act when the infringer is "sufficiently justified" in challenging 
the copyright. 
Some courts have held that a prejudgment-interest award is in-
appropriate when the copyright owner has received a sizable dam-
age award. In In Design v. K-Mart Apparel Corp., 101 the Second 
Circuit affirmed a lower court's refusal to award prejudgment inter-
est.108 The copyright owner had urged the court to apply the 
Rodgers analysis to the 1976 Act.109 The court decided that, regard-
less of the result of the analysis, the ultimate decision to award in-
terest in any particular case is still an equitable and discretionary 
one.no Since the copyright owner in that case had received a "siza-
ble" damage award and failed to take measures to shorten the liti-
gation, the district court's refusal to award interest was not an abuse 
of discretion.111 Thus, the court of appeals did not need to decide if 
the 1976 Copyright Act generally allows prejudgment interest.112 
The extent of a damages-plus-profits award, however, should 
not justify withholding prejudgment interest. Denying a copyright 
owner compensation for delay because she has been fully compen-
sated for other types of damages is inconsistent with Congress's in-
tent.113 Furthermore, delay damages are proportional to the size of 
other damages; as the other damages grow, so do the damages from 
delay. Assuming everything else is equal, to withhold prejudgment 
interest when other damages are large, but award it when they are 
small results in refusing relief when it is needed most. 
CONCLUSION 
The 1976 Copyright Act was the product of nearly two decades 
of study, debate, and negotiation. This product, at times quite com-
106. See 461 U.S. at 658 {Stevens, J., concurring). 
107. 13 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 1994). 
108. See 13 F.3d at 569. 
109. See 13 F.3d at 569. 
110. See 13 F.3d at 569. 
111. See 13 F.3d at 569. 
112. See 13 F.3d at 569; see also United States Payphone, Inc. v. Executives Unlimited, 
Nos. 89-1081, 89-1085, 1991 WL 64957, at *4 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 1991) {declining to state a 
general rule but holding that "actual damages plus [the infringer's] profits, if any, will suffi-
ciently compensate [the copyright owner] for its loss"); Bernard, supra note 29, at 472 ("Of 
course, an award of both profits and damages in a particular case may suggest that an addi-
tional award of prejudgment interest is cumulative and unnecessary."). 
113. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text. 
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plicated, is "not so much an expression of anyone's ideal as to how 
to draft legislation, but [is] the product of rather b.ard-fought com-
promises between conflicting interest groups."114 As a result, 
courts should strive to maintain the balance Congress constructed 
in 1976 by remaining faithful to Congress's original objectives for 
the Act. This is especially true when construing section 504, which 
Congress identified as the "cornerstone of the remedies section and 
the bill as a whole."115 Prejudgment interest, granted in a manner 
consistent with the goals of section 504, can play an important role 
in preserving this balance. 
114. Melville B. Nimmer, Preface to the 1978 Comprehensive Treatise Revision of 3 NIM-
MER & NIMMER, supra note 72, at vi. 
115. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 161. 
